On price convergence in Eurozone by David Guerreiro & Valérie Mignon
On price convergence in Eurozone
Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense 
 (bâtiments T et G)
200, Avenue de la République
92001 NANTERRE CEDEX
Tél et Fax : 33.(0)1.40.97.59.07
Email : nasam.zaroualete@u-paris10.fr
Document de Travail 
Working Paper
2011-34




UMR 7235On price convergence in Eurozone∗
David Guerreiro† Valérie Mignon‡
November 20, 2011
Abstract
We investigate price level convergence with Germany in eleven countries belonging to
the Eurozone between January 1970 and July 2011. Relying on smooth transition re-
gression models, we show that the price convergence process is nonlinear, depending on
the size of the price diﬀerential: for most countries, price convergence occurs only when
price diﬀerentials with Germany exceed a certain threshold. Moreover, our ﬁndings put
forward some heterogeneity across the Eurozone members in terms of price convergence
speed, that can be explained by the evolution of price-competitiveness, rigidities in labor
markets, but also by specialization patterns.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C22, E31, F15, F41.
Keywords: price convergence, Eurozone, smooth transition regression models, half-life.
1 Introduction
One controversial criterion to enter the EMU is the convergence of inﬂation rates, which is
based on the similarity of inﬂation rates rather than on a convergence in price levels. After
the eﬀorts made in 1996-1997 to reach EMU criteria, inﬂation rates have diverged within the
Euro area.
Though part of it may be explained by the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect, this divergence has in-
volved signiﬁcant real interest rate diﬀerentials within the zone; some countries experiencing
negative real interest rates that have encouraged debt bubbles. Fleming (1971) was the ﬁrst
to highlight the importance of price level convergence between members of a monetary union
under the Optimum Currency Areas’ theory. According to him, the main optimality criterion
rests in the similarity of inﬂation rates between members: spreads of relative costs that are not
oﬀset by productivity gains lead immediately to a loss in competitiveness via a deterioration
in terms of trade. In turn, this leads to a demand reallocation from “high inﬂation” countries
to “low inﬂation” ones, generating external disequilibria between economies (deﬁcits for high
inﬂation countries and surpluses for low inﬂation countries). This risk did materialized in
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going internal imbalances (excess leverage, asset price bubbles) and external deﬁcits. After
the sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2011, the question is whether these countries will manage in
adjusting their price levels without the help of a nominal exchange rate devaluation, and how
long this is going to take.
The literature dealing with price convergence primarily relies on the empirical veriﬁcation of
the Law Of One Price (LOOP) or the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Four main approaches
can be distinguished. The ﬁrst one tries to circumvent the problems inherent to incomplete
microeconomic panels by focusing on a speciﬁc market. Goldberg and Verboven (2005) pay a
special interest to the price dispersion on the car market in ﬁve European countries (Germany,
Belgium, Italy, France and United Kingdom). The results show that there is price convergence
that tends to validate the relative—and to a lesser extent the absolute—LOOP hypothesis.
As the authors point out, however, it is diﬃcult to extend this conclusion to other goods. Lutz
(2003) achieves a comparable study based on the Big Mac indicator of The Economist, and
on the price of ﬁve varieties of cars within the Eurozone. The results are at odds with those
of Goldberg and Verboven (2005), since the introduction of the euro seems to have only little
eﬀect.1
The second approach consists in transforming microeconomic panels to obtain comparable
individuals (see Engel and Rogers (2004), Crucini et al. (2005) and Rogers (2007)). Using the
Economic Intelligence Unit database, Engle and Rogers (2004) and Rogers (2007) analyze the
price of “standard” goods measured in 18 cities belonging to the Eurozone. The results are
broadly similar in the sense that a reduction in price dispersion is found before the launch of
the euro, during the implementation of the European Single Act (1986). Crucini et al. (2005)
test the existence of LOOP by relying on the Eurostat database for four diﬀerent years (1975,
1980, 1985, 1990), and also provide evidence of price convergence.
The third approach uses inﬂation rates diﬀerentials (see Honohan and Lane (2003) and Arnold
and Verhoef (2004) among others). Beck and Weber (2005) show that the convergence process
is nonlinear: adjustment speeds seem to decrease after the introduction of the euro. Moreover,
they ﬁnd that the dispersion of inﬂation rates decreases only before the introduction of the
European currency.
Finally, the last approach is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Camarero et al. (2000)
tackle the price convergence between peripheral countries of the EU (Spain, Italy, United King-
dom) and Germany through time series unit root tests, and ﬁnd evidence of a catching-up
eﬀect. Cecchetti et al. (2002) assess the price convergence between 19 US cities using panel
unit root tests. According to Faber and Stockman (2009), as well as Crucini et al. (2005),
CPI may be useful only for testing the relative PPP (convergence in inﬂation rates) and not
the absolute PPP (convergence in price levels). Recalculating CPI that take into account
price diﬀerentials between countries, Faber and Stockman (2009) ﬁnd that price dispersion
has decreased through time for countries belonging to Eurozone. Allington et al. (2005) rely
on the Comparative Price Levels (CPL) supplied by Eurostat, and put forward a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the euro which leads to a reduction of price dispersion in EMU.
1These results are very questionable as there is only one observation after the introduction of the euro.
2Falling in this latter approach, our aim in this paper is to investigate price convergence among
twelve countries belonging to EMU. To this end, we consider monthly data over the January
1970 to July 2011 period. Relying on cointegration techniques, we show that the underlying
linear hypothesis regarding the price convergence process may be viewed as too restrictive.
To overcome this limit, we account for potential nonlinearities in the price adjustment process
through the estimation of smooth transition regression models. These models allow us to put
forward a diﬀerent behavior of prices depending on whether price diﬀerentials are above or
below a certain threshold. In other words, while price convergence may not be observed in
a standard linear framework, it can be at play only when price diﬀerentials are important
in terms of size. Furthermore, from the estimation of these models, it is possible to deduce
mean-reversion speeds in the case of convergence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and some stylized facts. Section
3 reports the estimation results, and Section 4 discusses our ﬁndings. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Data and stylized facts
Testing price level convergence amounts to testing absolute PPP. Accordingly, we use the





where RER is the real exchange rate, NER the nominal exchange rate (expressed as the
number of domestic currency units per foreign currency unit), P the domestic price level, and
P∗ the foreign price level. Obviously, within a currency union, NER is equal to one since the
currency is the same for all the members.
2.1 Data
Testing price convergence requires to select price series P and P∗. From a macroeconomic
viewpoint, CPI is the key indicator. Although as an index it is useful to depict the evolution
of prices (inﬂation), it gives no indication regarding the level of prices. CPI can thus not
be used for testing the convergence of price levels. To overcome this issue, we rely on the
International Comparison Program (ICP) carried by the World Bank that aims at providing
comparable international prices. Based on this framework, Eurostat and OECD have com-
puted Comparative Price Level (CPL) series for each European country. These CPLs are
deﬁned by the OECD as the ratio between purchasing power parity conversion factor for pri-
vate consumption2 and the nominal exchange rate. This ratio measures price level diﬀerences
between two countries (in our case between a European country and the United States) and
can be expressed as follows:
2Following the World Bank deﬁnition, the PPP conversion factor for private consumption is the number of
units of a country’s currency required to buy the same amount of goods and services in the domestic market





where PPPi,t stands for the PPP conversion factor for private ﬁnal consumption of country
i relative to the United States at time t, expressed in euros per US dollar, and NERi,t is
the euro/dollar exchange rate at time t. Turning to data availability, CPLs are computed
by Eurostat and OECD for each European country annually only since 1995. It is however
possible to recover observations previous to 1995 using the price evolution relative to the
US in each European country—i.e. using the relative CPIs corrected by the exchange rate
variations. More speciﬁcally, we construct the monthly domestic price level series of country












where i = 1,...,12 denotes the European country. PPPi,2005 is the PPP for private consump-
tion for country i relative to the US in 2005 (euros per US dollar). CPIi,t, CPIi,2005, CPIUS,t
and CPIUS,2005 are respectively the country i’s CPI at time t and at year 2005, and the US
CPI at time t and at year 2005. NERi,2005 is the euro/dollar exchange rate in year 2005. 2005
has been chosen as the basis year because it corresponds to the year of the last ICP survey
realized by the World Bank.3 From Equation (3), we thus obtain 12 series of price levels that
can be used to test for price convergence. Given the importance of Germany in the Eurozone,
we retain this country as the benchmark, and investigate convergence between each domestic
price level series and the German one.
2.2 Stylized facts
Figure 1 depicts German and domestic price levels (in logarithms) for each country over the
period from January 1970 to July 2011. Price diﬀerentials and their evolution are quite
diﬀerent across countries during the period under study. Three groups can be distinguished.
The ﬁrst group is characterized by some price diﬀerentials at the beginning of the period
that tend to ﬁll over time. Countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, and Italy belong to this group. Within this group, some diﬀerences across
countries have however to be mentioned. Austria and the Netherlands exhibit a similar pattern
in the sense that price diﬀerentials with Germany tend to disappear at the end of the period—
price level series being indeed very close in the 2000s. Belgium, France and Luxembourg
experience some price diﬀerentials at the beginning of the period, that tend to be highly
reduced after the implementation of the Single Act before exhibiting higher domestic price
levels than Germany in the 2000s. Italy can be added to this ﬁrst group of countries since its
price diﬀerential with Germany, while being important at the beginning of the period, is also
very weak in the 2000s. In the second group, made of Finland and Ireland, domestic prices
are higher than the German price level most of the time. Important gaps are at play, that
are not ﬁlled but tend to stabilize at the end of the period, specially for Finland. In the last
3PPP series are extracted from the OECD database. NER and CPI series are from IFS, except the German
and the Irish CPIs that come from Datastream.
4group, composed by Greece, Portugal, and Spain, important negative price diﬀerentials are
at play, domestic prices being always lower than the German level. For these three countries,
the price gaps tend to diminish across time, specially since the mid-1990s. Finally, all price
series show a global upward trend and evidence of non-stationarity.
3 Testing price convergence: Empirical analysis
3.1 Cointegration analysis
To assess convergence between price series, we rely on unit root and cointegration techniques
by estimating an ADF-type equation:4
∆xt = k + φxt−1 +
p X
i=1
φi∆xt−i + t (4)
where xt denotes the diﬀerential between domestic (Pt) and German (P∗
t ) prices (in logs):
xt = lnPt − lnP∗
t (5)
If the null hypothesis φ = 0 in Equation (4) is rejected, the price diﬀerential is non-stationary,
meaning that there is no price convergence. In the case where the null is rejected, it is pos-
sible to calculate the half-life of deviations (−ln(2)/ln(1 + φ)) which provides an indication
regarding the speed of price mean reversion.
We divide our whole period into three sub-samples in order to account for the diﬀerent steps
of the EMU construction. The ﬁrst period concerns the Common Market (established by the
Rome Treaty in 1953) and ends in 1987 with the implementation of the Single Act. The latter
deﬁnes the second period starting on July 1987 and ending in December 1998. The last period
starts with the introduction of the euro in January 1999.
Results of cointegration tests are presented in Table 1 which displays the p-values relating to
the ADF-type test5 and the half-life of deviations (in years). With the exception of some few
special cases,6 there is no convergence at all since the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis
of no cointegration between domestic and German prices. This absence of evidence of conver-
gence may come from the assumption of linearity implicit in the ADF-type and Johansen tests,
a hypothesis that may be too restrictive and strong. Even if economic integration of Euro-
zone members globally increased over time, some idiosyncratic characteristics remain (such as
economic policy) that could prevent prices to converge at given times. However, this absence
of convergence may be only temporary and dependent on the size of the price diﬀerential.
4Previous to the application of cointegration tests, a battery of unit root tests have been applied showing
that all price series are integrated of order one. The detailed results are available upon request from the
authors. Note that Equation (4) does not include a deterministic trend, the latter being non signiﬁcant.
5Johansen (1988, 1991)’s tests have also been applied, leading to the same conclusions.
6At the 1% signiﬁcance level, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for Portugal and Spain at
the end of the period, and for Austria during the second sub-period. Note however that half-lives for Portugal
and Spain are quite long, meaning that price convergence, when it exists, takes a long time.



























































































1970M1 1975M1 1980M1 1985M1 1990M1 1995M1 2000M1 2005M1 2010M1
 




























1970M1 1975M1 1980M1 1985M1 1990M1 1995M1 2000M1 2005M1 2010M1
Note: Dotted line: domestic price level; Bold line: German price level. 
7Table 1: Cointegration tests results
1970.01-1987.06 1987.07-1998.12 1999.01-2011.07
p-value Half-life p-value Half-life p-value Half-life
Austria 0.0700* 48 0.0001*** 0.2 0.6677
Belgium 0.3824 0.2513 0.8373
Finland 0.7334 0.7609 0.1358
France 0.0661* 2 0.5410 0.3531
Greece 0.1180 0.5343 0.9717
Ireland 0.6870 0.5132 0.1236
Italy 0.3395 0.6533 0.1715
Luxembourg 0.3450 0.1222 0.7061
Netherlands 0.3198 0.3442 0.0969* 1.6
Portugal 0.1846 0.0402** 9.8 0.0050*** 12.5
Spain 0.3441 0.6428 0.0008*** 5.5
*** (resp. **, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% (resp. 5%,
10%) signiﬁcance level. Half-lives are expressed in years.
Indeed, while convergence may not be observed for low price diﬀerentials, it can take place
when domestic and German prices are highly diﬀerent. In other words, it seems reasonable to
think that convergence may occur only when the price diﬀerential exceeds a certain threshold
since the loss of competitiveness, but also the regional commitments (such Maastricht treaty)
exert a mean-reverting force. Domestic prices may thus depart from German prices until a
given gap is overtaken, and the mean-reverting forces constrain members to adopt measures
to ensure price convergence. This hypothesis will be tested in the next subsection, but the
results of cointegration tests showing that convergence is observed for Portugal (for some sub-
periods) which is typically characterized by important price diﬀerentials are consistent with
our intuition.
3.2 Nonlinear analysis
To investigate the nonlinearity of the price convergence process, we proceed to the estimation
of smooth transition regression (STR) models. These models are characterized by the existence
of two regimes—corresponding respectively to low and high price diﬀerentials—the transition
from one regime to the other being smooth and determined endogenously depending on the
value of an observed, transition variable. They are particularly suitable for our purpose since
they allow us to account for the fact that correction of disequilibria may be at play when price
diﬀerentials exceed a certain threshold. More speciﬁcally, the STR speciﬁcation is given by:
∆xt =
"












× F (γ,c;∆xt−d) + t
(6)
where t is an i.i.d. process, ∆xt−d is the transition variable (d being an integer), and
F(γ,c;∆xt−d) is the transition function which is bounded between 0 and 1. c denotes the
8threshold parameter, and γ is the slope parameter that determines the smoothness of the
transition from one regime to the other. Two transition functions are commonly considered
(Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992)):
• A logistic function (LSTR model):
F(γ,c;∆xt−d) = (1 + exp(−γ(∆xt−d − c)))−1 (7)
• An exponential function (ESTR model):
F(γ,c;∆xt−d) = 1 − exp(−γ(∆xt−d − c)2) (8)
The LSTR speciﬁcation accounts for asymmetric realizations: the two regimes are charac-
terized by diﬀerent dynamics, being associated with small and large values of the transition
variable relative to the threshold value. In the ESTR speciﬁcation, the two regimes have
similar structures, but the middle grounds are characterized by diﬀerent dynamics.
Following the sequential strategy developed by Teräsvirta (1994) for the speciﬁcation of STR
processes, we start by applying linearity tests using the lagged price diﬀerential as the tran-
sition variable.7 The null of linearity is rejected in favor of the nonlinear alternative for all
countries, but Finland. The LSTR alternative is retained for seven countries; France, Portugal
and Spain being the countries for which the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the ESTR
alternative.
Table 2: Estimation results of STR models (whole sample)
Model β1 β2 β1 + β2 linear non-linear ˆ c1 ˆ c2
half-life half-life
Austria LSTR -0.0012 -0.0130** -0.0142 4.03 -0.0028
Belgium LSTR -0.0124 -0.1527*** -0.1651 0.32 0.0141
Finland Null hypothesis of linearity not rejected
France ESTR -0.0344*** -0.3061*** -0.3405 1.65 0.14 -0.0412 0.0251
Greece LSTR 0.0818 -1.0155* -0.9337 0.25 0.1567
Ireland LSTR 0.9063* -0.9453* -0.0389 1.45 -0.0762
Italy LSTR -0.1801*** 0.1706*** -0.0094 0.29 6.11 -0.0255
Luxembourg LSTR -0.1094*** 0.0953*** -0.0140 0.49 4.08 -0.0082
Netherlands LSTR 1.1419*** -1.1653*** -0.0233 2.45 -0.0233
Portugal ESTR -0.0039 -0.3149*** -0.3189 0.15 -0.0501 0.0505
Spain ESTR -0.1380** 0.1685 0.1547 4.16 -0.0575 0.0589
*** (resp. **, *): signiﬁcant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level. Half-lives are expressed in years.
Results in Table 2 put forward the interest of our nonlinear modelling: while results from
standard tests globally revealed no evidence of price convergence, the ﬁndings from STR es-
timations show that this phenomenon is observed for all countries of our panel. Austria,
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal exhibit price convergence only in
the nonlinear regime, whereas France, Italy and Luxembourg experience convergence in both
linear and nonlinear regimes. The fact that price convergence is obtained for most countries
7The complete results are available upon request from the authors. Following Teräsvirta (1994), the number
of lags for the transition variable has been selected by minimizing the p-values of the linearity tests.
9in the nonlinear regime validates our previous hypothesis: the correction of disequilibria only
takes place when price diﬀerentials exceed a certain level. The latter is given by the estimated
value of the threshold parameter.8 The value of ˆ c1 is quite heterogeneous accross countries.
It is very low for Austria, conﬁrming the graphical analysis (see Figure 1) showing very small
price diﬀerentials between Austria and Germany. More generally, the value of ˆ c1 in the LSTR
speciﬁcation is lower for countries belonging to the ﬁrst group of economies previously identi-
ﬁed, varying between -2.55% for Italy to 1.41% for Belgium. Turning to Ireland, disequilibria
are corrected only when price diﬀerentials are important, exceeding 7.62%, while Portuguese
disequilibria are not corrected when price diﬀerentials are in the [-5%, 5%] interval. The case
of Greece is particularly interesting since disequilibria are corrected only for (very) high values
of the price diﬀerential, the estimated threshold value—close to 16%—being the largest of our
sample of countries.
Mean-reversion speeds (or, equivalently, half-lives) are also quite heterogeneous across coun-
tries. More speciﬁcally, paying a special attention to the nonlinear regime, Belgium, France,
Greece, and Portugal exhibit very fast convergence, i.e. half-lives below one year. In France,
half-lives of deviations are lower in the nonlinear regime than in the linear one, indicating
that corrections of disequilibria are more rapid when these deviations are high. Ireland and
the Netherlands enhance a relatively fast convergence—with half-lives comprised between 1.45
and 2.45 years—while Austria, Luxembourg and Italy experience relatively low convergence
(half-lives larger than 4 years) that goes against the PPP on the short run. Results concerning
the mean-reversion speeds of Euroland core (Austria, Belgium, and France) are in line with the
expectations. The rapid convergence speeds of peripheral countries, as Greece and Portugal,
and to a lesser extent Ireland, is consistent with the current wisdom that these countries tend
to converge too quickly in case of large deviations, a fact that may be linked to their fragile
economic situations, specially for Greece (see below).
Finally, Finland is the only country that does not exhibit price convergence, conﬁrming the
long-lasting price diﬀerential observed in Figure 1. One possible explanation may come from
the “Scandinavian model” involving that Finland’s economic structures are quite diﬀerent
from those of Continental or Mediterranean countries, making this economy relatively more
“independent” from the Eurozone than the other members. In other words, Finland may have
experienced idiosyncratic economic ﬂuctuations that are not correlated to the rest of the Eu-
rozone, such as the banking crisis of the early 1990s. The entry in the European Union in 1995
and in EMU in 1999, may tend to erase this idiosyncrasy, increasing the correlation of the
economy with the rest of the Eurozone. However, due to data availability issues, this long-run
phenomenon is not caught by our study.
4 Analysis of the results
To explain and assess the relevance of the obtained mean-reversion speeds, we rely on the
evolution of competitiveness in EMU. To this end, we (i) ﬁrst review a panel of general
8Recall that, due to the non stationarity of the price diﬀerential, the transition variable xt−d is expressed
in ﬁrst diﬀerence. Consequently, the value of the threshold parameter ˆ c1 in the LSTR speciﬁcation should be
interpreted in absolute terms, its sign depending on the sign of the price diﬀerential.
10macroeconomic indicators that account for price-competitiveness, (ii) focus on labor market
institutions since they may be the source of some rigidities that hamper price convergence,
and (iii) then pay interest to the production patterns (specialization) because they partly
determine non-cost competitiveness.
4.1 Price competitiveness
Price competitiveness can be simply deﬁned as the capacity to defend or conquer market shares
on domestic as well as on foreign markets by oﬀering lower prices than competitors. One of
the most important leverage of price-competitiveness is certainly productivity, as pointed out
by Fleming (1971) when studying price convergence. However, several other indicators also
exist, some of them being displayed in Table 3 together with productivity. The ﬁrst four
measures are real indicators and relate to the eﬃciency of production. The ﬁfth indicator
(current account) is a monetary indicator that allows to appraise the external competitiveness
encompassing under/over-valuations of exchange rates. Finally, the last one is the productiv-
ity per hour in euros, which is a proxy of the productivity level.
Table 3: Macroeconomic indicators over 1987-1998 and 1999-2009
Output Productivity Inﬂation Unit labor Current Producti-
growth growth cost growth account vity level
Period 87-98 99-09 87-98 99-09 87-98 99-09 87-98 99-09 87-98 99-09 2009
Austria 2.54 1.87 1.50 1.41 2.45 1.85 1.18 1.02 -2.75 1.65 38.1
Belgium 2.39 1.72 2.18 0.85 2.18 2.04 2.17 2.11 5.25 2.70 NA
Finland 2.20 2.26 3.12 1.59 3.04 1.61 2.01 2.16 4.75 5.90 39.1
France 2.21 1.61 2.30 1.21 2.31 1.61 1.19 1.79 2 0.49 45.6
Germany 2.51 0.95 2.48 1.09 2.45 1.46 1.80 0.61 -0.75 3.15 40.9
Greece 1.79 3.32 1.29 2,37 12.67 3.24 12.92 3.43 NA -8.55 19.5
Ireland 6.30 4.33 4.53 2.91 2.57 2.69 1.47 2.76 2.25 -1.96 46.8
Italy 1.97 0.60 1.73 0.13 4.66 2.16 3.74 2.69 2.5 -1.25 31.4
Luxembourg 5.12 4.02 2.32 0.72 2.12 2.22 1.70 2.88 10.75 9.80 NA
Netherlands 3.09 1.86 1.88 0.98 1.95 2.06 1.38 2.42 5 5.10 45.2
Portugal 3.83 1.22 3.25 1.31 7.45 2.48 7.96 2.65 -4.25 -9.60 16
Spain 3.13 2.80 1.73 0.88 4.73 2.81 5.30 2.92 -0.25 -5.90 30
Average of the 2.94 2.21 3.57 1.29 4.05 2.19 3.57 2.29 2.27 0.14 35.26
12 countries
Source : OECD and Eurostat. This table reports the annual growth rates of GDP, productivity, unit labor
cost, as well as the current account balances, the inﬂation rate and the productivity per hour in euros.
Focusing on the countries that belong to the core of the Eurozone, the evolution of the macroe-
conomic indicators between the periods 1987-1998 and 1999-2009 is mixed. In Austria, price-
competitiveness has been preserved, while it has somewhat deteriorated in France and Bel-
gium. Indeed, although all countries have experienced a decrease in the GDP as well as in the
productivity growth rates, the fall is more marked in Belgium and France. Current accounts
uphold this general picture with balances improved in Austria, and degraded in Belgium and
France (even if they present surpluses indicating that they still are competitive). The Nether-
lands, the last country belonging to the core, is atypical. Despite showing fundamentals below
the average in terms of output and productivity growth, inﬂation and unit labor costs, the
Netherlands seems to be still price-competitive since it exhibits large current account surpluses
11that tend to increase between the two periods, and also one of the highest productivity level
of the zone.
Paying now attention to the peripheral countries, the situations of Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain are even more heterogeneous. The high GDP and productivity growth rates dur-
ing the two periods markedly above the average of the zone, the increase of the costs (with
inﬂation rates and unit labor costs slightly above the partners average) as well as the se-
vere degradation of the current account denote a loss of price-competitiveness and are strong
evidences that Ireland has experienced a Balassa-Samuelson catching-up phenomenon. The
latter is moreover conﬁrmed by the productivity level that is the highest of the Eurozone.
Thereby, the relatively fast mean-reversion speed is not surprising. The case of the remaining
countries is much controversial. In Greece, GDP and productivity growth rates are low and
far under the Eurozone average in the ﬁrst period, even if after 1999, there is a real improve-
ment of these two indicators. However, the inﬂation level, the expansion of labor costs and
the massive deﬁcit of current accounts support the view that the convergence speed is too
high for Greece. The convergence of prices is not due to an economic catching-up since the
productivity level is far under the average of the zone, but rather to a tremendous loss of
price-competitiveness. To a lesser extent, Portugal and Spain experience the same process.
The productivity and GDP gains are not sustained enough within and between the two pe-
riods to evidence a Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect, the productivity levels are low, especially for
Portugal that enhances the lowest level of the panel. The pace of inﬂation and the increase
in unit labor costs are much above the partners average. Moreover, current accounts exhibit
deﬁcits that boom in the second period, suggesting that the euro was probably overvalued for
these two countries.
Concerning Italy, the indicators follow a downward slope. Economic performances are largely
beyond that of the European average and have worsen between the two periods. Growth and
productivity gains are apathetic, and even if inﬂation is controlled in the second period, it
remains above or very close to the average, just as the unit labor cost. Moreover, the current
account surplus of the ﬁrst period turns to a deﬁcit in the second period, and productivity
level is below the average. In the light of these analyses, it appears that Italy has, just as
Greece, Spain and Portugal, suﬀered from a harsh loss of price-competitiveness. The diﬀerence
with the peripheral countries is that domestic price levels are higher, and the quite elevated
half-lives previously found is consistent with the economic situation of the country.
4.2 Labor market
Labor market institutions may also provide useful informations regarding competitiveness and
convergence inside a monetary area. Indeed, in the tradition of the creative destruction lit-
erature (Schumpeter, 1942), Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Lentz and Mortensen (2005)
ﬁnd evidence of a positive relationship between factor reallocation (especially labor) and pro-
ductivity growth. Hence, labor market institutions that experience some rigidities as high
levels of employment protection or high shares of long-term unemployment, may fail to fairly
reallocate resources when innovations appear and technical progress is diﬀused within the
economy, which in turn hampers productivity growth. Moreover, these kinds of rigidities are
taken into account by companies when they decide to invest, and, other things being equal,
12high rigidities may disincentive investments which restraints again innovation and technical
progress diﬀusion. The case is particularly crucial for countries that have a low level of pro-
ductivity and need technological transfers (through FDIs) to improve it, such as Greece or
Portugal.
To investigate the relationship between labor market rigidities and convergence speed, we
rely on the following indicators retrieved from the OECD database:9 the level of employment
protection (the higher the value, the higher the protection) displayed in Figure 2, the share
of long-term unemployment in total unemployment, and the percentage of GDP devoted to
programs of “active” unemployment policies (such as training, employment incentives, or sup-
ported employment) reported in Table 4.
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The employment protection indicator10 is a synthetic index that “measures the procedures and
costs involved in dismissing individuals groups of workers and the procedures involved in hir-
ing workers on ﬁxed-term or temporary work agency contracts” (OECD). According to Figure
2, three groups of countries can be distinguished. The ﬁrst group includes countries that
are characterized by high employment protection levels: Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, and
Spain. On the sole basis of this indicator, price convergence appears too fast in Portugal
and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Luxembourg: the labor market fails to provide enough
labor mobility to allow for price convergence without prejudicing productivity (and hence
price-competitiveness). Greece is characterized by both a very high convergence speed and
9Except for Belgium for which data on employment protection were unavailable.
10The values for employment protection are the average on the 1985-2009 period, except for Luxembourg
for which the 2009 value is considered.
13low labor mobility, appearing as isolated from the rest of the countries regarding these statis-
tics. In the second group, composed by Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, price
convergence speeds seem to be consistent with the degree of employment protection: labor is
mobile enough to maintain productivity growth, conﬁrming the results found in Subsection
4.1. Finally, Austria and Ireland should have experienced a faster convergence speed given
the labor rigidities.
Rigidities are a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be approached only by a sole
proxy. Variables listed in Table 4 aim at controlling the degree of reallocation from (i) the
long-term unemployment share in the total unemployment, and (ii) policies favoring labor
mobility. The interesting cases are those of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These countries
are characterized by high long-term unemployment shares in the total unemployment (long-
term unemployment is around or above 50% of total unemployment) combined with poor
active programs destinated to improve mobility. With regard to employment protection, these
countries suﬀer from a lack of labor mobility that harms their productivity.
Table 4: Long-term unemployment and active programs
Share of long-term Share of GDP dedicated











Source: OECD. The values are the averages of the period 1985-2009 except for active pro-
grams in the case of: Greece (1985-1997), Italy (2004-2009), and Luxembourg (2002-2009).
4.3 Specialization
Until now, we have only paid attention to price-competitiveness. There is however a second
side in competitiveness that is likely to inﬂuence price levels: non-cost competitiveness. This
kind of competitiveness consists for a producer in diﬀerentiating its products in order to evade
market laws, and carry out a higher price than in perfect competition. At a country level,
the main strategy is to specialize in high technological industries. The issue comes from het-
erogeneity in specialization among members of a single currency area, because there are two
opposite price dynamics at play. On the one hand, countries specialized in low technology are
rather the less advanced of the zone, and exhibit low price levels. They compete thanks to
low prices and are very sensitive to costs increase and nominal exchange rate appreciation.
On the other hand, countries specialized in high technological industries are the leaders of the
zone and exhibit high price levels. Other things equal, they are less sensitive to costs increase
and exchange rate appreciation. Since price convergence operates toward leaders’ price levels,
countries specialized in low technological industries have to “go upmarket” (i.e. specialize in
14high tech industries), otherwise it entails a dramatic loss of price-competitiveness. This might
be one of the explanation to the problems of EMU, in particular for Greece and Portugal.
Here, we aim at testing this hypothesis. It is however diﬃcult to ﬁnd measures of specializa-
tion. To overcome this issue, we construct a simple index of technological specialization on
the basis of the revealed comparative advantages for the manufacturing CITI indicator (see
Appendix 1 for the construction of the index). The underlying idea is that the technological
content illustrates a non-cost competitiveness tendency.
Table 5: Technological specialization in 1987-1998 and 1999-2009
Specialization
Period 87-98 99-09
Austria high technology high technology
Belgium medium technology medium technology
Finland high technology high technology
France high technology high technology
Germany superior technology superior technology
Greece low technology low technology
Ireland medium technology medium technology
Italy medium technology medium technology
Luxembourg NA NA
Netherlands high technology high technology
Portugal low technology low technology
Spain medium technology medium technology
Source : OCDE. NA : non available.
Table 5 reports the technological specialization as well as the openness rate for each country
during the periods 1987-1998 and 1999-2009. Again, we can classify the countries in diﬀerent
categories:
• Our benchmark country, Germany is specialized in industries with high technological
contents: its products are innovative, or positioned on the high quality segment, which
allows it to discriminate its prices.
• Austria, Finland, France, and the Netherlands own at equal shares high and medium
technology industries. They have a lower market power than Germany, even if it remains
substantial.
• Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Spain are mainly specialized in medium-technology sectors,
and have very few high-tech industries. Moreover, low-technology sectors represent an
important part of specialization in Spain and Italy.
• Greece and Portugal are mostly specialized in low-technology industries, facing a strong
competition in prices.
The core of Eurozone (Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany) is consti-
tuted by countries that are specialized in high-technology industries (except Belgium). It is
interesting to notice that it surely might be thanks to its specialization that the Netherlands
do not have experienced a greater loss of competitiveness. In contrast, Belgium succeeds to
15maintain its competitiveness despite the lower technological content of its industries relative to
the other core countries. Coming after these leaders, Ireland, Italy and Spain present medium
technology industries. If Ireland is a special case due to strong evidence of a Balassa-Samuelson
catching-up eﬀect, Italy and Spain failed to evolve their industries to more technological con-
tents, which has been detrimental to their competitiveness: the low mean-reversion speeds
we found are then consistent. The case of Greece and Portugal is even more evocative: just
as Italy and Spain, they failed to climb the technological ladder, but since they were below
these latter, the loss of competitiveness is even greater, which supports the view that they are
experiencing a too fast price convergence speed.
5 Conclusion
Very few studies analyze price convergence in the Eurozone despite the fact that this criterion
conditions the optimality of any monetary union. To compensate for that lack, this paper
investigates the convergence between price levels of twelve Eurozone members on the January
1970-July 2011 period. Relying on smooth transition regression (STR) models, we show that
the price adjustment process is nonlinear, depending on the size of the price diﬀerential: for
most countries, price convergence occurs only when price diﬀerentials across members exceed a
certain threshold. Moreover, our ﬁndings put forward some heterogeneity across the Eurozone
members in terms of price convergence speed, that we explain by relying on competitiveness
indicators and countries’ technological specialization patterns. The core group of countries
composed by Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands is characterized by relatively
high price convergence speeds relative to Germany, in line with their price-competitiveness
indicators, their market labor structures, and their specializations in high-technology prod-
ucts. The high convergence speeds observed in peripheral countries, such as Greece and
Portugal which are specialized in low-technology products, mainly come from their loss in
price-competitiveness. Finally, our ﬁndings obtained for Ireland reﬂect that this country has
experienced a Balassa-Samuelson catching-up phenomenon.
Appendix
The deﬁnition of the technological specialization is based on the revealed comparative advan-
tages for trade micro-indicators in the manufacturing category (CITI database, available on
OECD). Table 6 reports the sector associated to each number.
On the basis of the analysis of these indexes at a disaggregated level, we consider the following
typology:
• Specialization in low technology sectors: indexes 15 to 21.
• Specialization in medium technology sectors: indexes 22 to 28 and 36.
• Specialization in high technology sectors: indexes 29 to 35.
Note that index 23 has a high technology industry, that of nuclear, in which only France
is specialized. Accordingly, we consider that for France index 23 testiﬁes a high technology
specialization. In Table 7, we report for the two sub-periods the sectors in which countries
are specialized.
16Table 6: Deﬁnition of CITI indexes
Index Deﬁnition
15 food products and beverages
16 tobacco products
17 textiles
18 wearing apparel ; dressing and dyeing of fur
19 dressing of leather ; luggage
20 woods and products of wood and cork (except furnitures)
21 paper and paper products
22 publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
23 coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
24 chemical products
25 rubber and plastic products
26 non metallic mineral products
27 basic metals
28 fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipments)
29 machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery
31 electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 radio and television communication equipment
33 medical, precision and optical instruments
34 motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 other transport equipment
36 furniture, manufacturing n.e.c.
Source : CITI, OECD.
Bibliography
Allington, N.F.B., Kattuman, P.A. and F.A. Waldmann (2005), “One Market, One Money,
One Price?”, International Journal of Central Banking 1(3), 73-115.
Arnold, I.J.M and B.A. Verhoef (2004), “External causes of euro zone inﬂation diﬀerentials.
A re-examination of the evidence”, Intereconomics 39, 254-263.
Bartelsman, E.J. and E. Doms (2000), “Understanding productivity: lessons from longitudinal
microdata”, Journal of Economic Literature 38, 569-594.
Beck, A.A. and G.W. Weber (2005), “Price stability, inﬂation convergence, and diversity in
EMU: does one size ﬁt all?”, Manuscript, Goethe University Frankfurt.
Camarero, M., Esteve, V. and C. Tamarit (2000), “Price convergence of peripheral countries
on the way to EMU: A time series approach”, Empirical Economics 25, 149-168.
Cecchetti, S.G., Mark, N.C. and R. Schuman (2002), “Price index convergence among United
States cities”, International Economic Review 43, 1081-1099.
Crucini, M.J., Telmer, C.I. and M. Zachariadis (2005), “Understanding European real exchange
rates”, American Economic Review 95, 724-738.
Engel, C. and J.H. Rogers (2004), “European product market integration after the euro”,
Economic Policy 19, 347-384.
17Table 7: Specialization of Eurozone members based on comparative revealed advantages
Specialization
Period 1987-1998 1999-2009
Austria 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25,
28, 29, 31, 34, 36 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36
Belgium 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 15, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26,
34 27, 34
Finland 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31,
35, 36 32, 35, 36
France 15, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
31, 34, 35 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35
Germany 21, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 33, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 31, 33,
34, 35 34, 35
Greece 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 27 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26,
27, 28
Ireland 15, 22, 24, 30 15, 22, 24, 30
Italy 17, 18, 19, 26, 28, 29 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 26, 28,
29
Netherlands 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 33 16, 22, 23, 24, 30, 33
Portugal 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
28, 31, 34, 36 23, 26, 28, 31, 34, 36
Spain 15, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 15, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
34 28, 34
Source: classiﬁcation established by the authors on the basis of CITI and OECD data.
Engle, R.F. and C.W.J. Granger (1987), “Co-integration and error correction: Representation,
estimation and testing”, Econometrica 55(2), 251-276.
Faber, R.P. and C.J. Stockman (2009), “A short history of price level convergence in theory
in Europe”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41, 461-477.
Fleming, M. (1971), “On exchange rate uniﬁcation”, Economic Journal 81, 467-488.
Goldberg, P.K. and F. Verboven (2005), “Market integration and convergence to the law of
one price: evidence from the European car market”, Journal of International Economics 65,
49-73.
Honohan, P. and P. Lane (2003), “Divergent inﬂation rates in EMU”, Economic Policy 18,
357-394.
Lentz, R. and D.T. Mortensen (2005), “Productivity growth and worker reallocation”, Inter-
national Economic Review 46, 731-749.
Lutz, M. (2003), “Price convergence under EMU: ﬁrst estimates”, Discussion Paper n°2003-08,
University of Saint Gallen.
Rogers, J.H. (2007), “Monetary union, price level convergence and inﬂation: how close is
Europe to the USA?”, Journal of Monetary Economics 71, 259-270.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942), Capitalism, socialism and democracy, Harper and Row (New-York).
Teräsvirta, T. (1994), “Speciﬁcation, estimation, and evaluation of smooth transition autore-
gressive models”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 89(425), 208-218.
18Terävirta, T. and H.M. Anderson (1992), “Characterizing nonlinearities in business cycles using
smooth transition autoregressive models”, Journal of Applied Econometrics 7(S), S119-36.
19